ABSTRACT-The efficiency loss of two kinds of player (UE player and CN players) traffic assignment under road pricing is investigated, the users under UE player aim to minimize her/his own travel cost, the users belonging to the same CN player can fully cooperate with each other and different players will fully compete with each other, The users of one CN player aim to minimize their own total travel cost while compete with users of other players. Firstly, a variational inequality (VI) model is established to describing this mixed routing game. Then, the upper bound of UE-CN mixed equilibrium traffic assignment is derived by analytic derivation when the road pricing is consider as (not consider as) part of total travel costs, respectively. Results show that the upper bound is a constant when road pricing is considered as part of total travel costs and the link travel cost functions satisfy some given conditions. The upper bound depends on the class of link travel cost functions and the road pricing scheme when road pricing is not considered as part of total travel costs.
INTRODUCTION
The Brass Paradox in traffic assignment shown that the user equilibrium (UE) is generally not identical with the system optimum (SO) as viewed from total travel cost [1] . However, the gap between the SO and the UE in the worst case had been unknown for a long time. Roughgarden and Tardos [2] introduced the efficiency loss (the price of anarchy) into traffic network and used it to quantify the difference between the UE and the SO, they achieved that for separable linear link travel cost functions, the upper bound of the efficiency loss is tight at 4/3. Karakostas and Kolliopoulos [3] showed it is 5/4 after levying road pricing and road pricing were considered as part of the system cost. Reference [4] investigated the efficiency loss in fixed demand and elastic demand with road pricing scheme. Han and Yang [5] obtained several bounds of the efficiency loss for traffic equilibrium problem where there are multiple classes of users with a discrete set of value of time when the road pricing were considered (not considered) as part of the total travel cost, with the time-based criterion and the cost-based criterion, respectively. Later, researchers have studied the efficiency loss of transportation network under road pricing in different aspects [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] .
Traffic assignment under UE principle is a nonatomic routing game by game terminology. It is a non-cooperative Nash game with many infinitesimal users, and all users are competitive each other. In the case of SO, it is assumed that all users are cooperative and instructed by a single player to minimize the total cost of the system. This means there exist many infinitesimal players in the UE principle and there is only one central player in the SO principle. Harker [10] examined that the network has different CN players and UE player at the same time and obtained a new network equilibrium model. Reference [11] considered such a situation that the network has an additional player aiming to improve the overall system performance by controlling part of flows and further extended the above model. Yang and Zhang [12] studied the existence of anonymous link tolls in network with UE-CN mixed equilibrium behaviors. Yu and Huang [13] investigated the efficiency loss of UE-CN mixed equilibrium with polynomial cost functions by two approaches.
In this paper, we study the efficiency loss of UE-CN mixed equilibrium under road pricing. We suppose that all users following the UE principle in their routing decisions are considered as one single UE player and every CN player controls a strictly positive splittable flow. Under this assumption, in section 2, we present a VI formulation the traffic model of UE-CN mixed traffic assignment under road pricing. In section 3, we obtain the efficiency loss where road pricing are considered as part of total travel cost. In section 4, we investigate the efficiency loss where road pricing are not considered as part of total travel cost. In section 5, we provide some concluding remarks.
II.

MODEL OF UE-CN MIXED EQUILIBRIUM TRAFFIC
be a directed transportation network, where N and A denote the sets of nodes and links, respectively. U represents the UE player in the network. Let K be the set of CN players in the network; U W be the set of Origin-Destination (OD) pairs where users obey UE principle; k W be the set of OD pairs where users are controlled by a CN
Let w d be the demand between OD pair w W ∈ ; w R be the set of paths connecting OD pair , ,
∈ . Suppose r f be the flow on path r ; 
, , , , 
t v denote the average cost of traversing link a A ∈ . This cost function is assumed to be differentiable, convex, and monotonically increasing with the amount of link flow.
Suppose all OD demands are fixed. Thus, the feasible sets of link flows by the UE player and the CN players can be defined as follows: 
where
Since ( ) a a t v is monotonically increasing and convex function, the mapping function
is continues with the total link flows. It is easy to know that Ω is non empty, closed and convex set, and then the VI problem (1) has at least one solution [14] . It is obvious that the VI problem (1) has unique solution if ( ) c v  is strictly monotone function.
The SO model when road pricing not consider as part of system costs as following:
The SO model when road pricing consider as part of system costs as following:
If ( ) a a t v is monotonically increasing and convex function, the optimization problem (2) and (3) has a unique solution in terms of the aggregate link flows. Let v  and v  be the solution of optimization problem (2) and (3), then the total travel costs of UE-CN mixed equilibrium at system optimum as following:
Let v be a solution of the minimization problem (1) . Then the efficiency loss of the UE-CN mixed equilibrium when road pricing are not (are) part of system cost can be defined as
Next we focus on finding the upper bound of , ρ ρ  .
III.
BOUNDS OF EFFICIENCY LOSS: ROAD PRICING IS PART OF TOTAL TRAVEL COSTS
For v be a solution of the minimization problem (1) and ∈ Ω v  , with v replace by v  in (1), we have
Consider the following inequality:
where the first, second and last inequalities are satisfied respectively due to 
The second inequality in (9) always holds due to ( )
Combining with (9) and (10) 
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Proof: From equation (11), we have ( ) ( ) ( ) 
IV.
BOUNDS OF EFFICIENCY LOSS
If we can find an maximum for the sum of the second, third and fourth term in the RHS of (13), we then obtain the upper bound of ρ . Let ( ) (
First, we proof function 
This means function ( ) F v is a concave function.
We define ( ) (2) . Then,
Proof: From equation (14) and (18), we have ( )
, then (19) is obtained. Theorem 2 states that when the road pricing are not part of the total travel costs, the upper bound of the efficiency loss depends on two parameters, namely ( ) 
V.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the efficiency loss of UE-CN mixed traffic assignment under road pricing by analytic derivation. Firstly, we obtained the VI model of UE-CN mixed traffic assignment under road pricing. Then, we derived the upper bound when the road pricing are (are not) part of the total travel costs. It is shown that the upper bound is a is a constant when road pricing is considered as part of total travel costs and the link travel cost functions satisfy some given conditions. The upper bound depends on the class of link travel cost functions and the road pricing scheme when road pricing is not considered as part of total travel costs. Our on-going study is to explore the tight lower upper bound and numerical results of the UE-CN mixed traffic assignment under road pricing.
